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Abstract
Today, the concept of service oriented architectures provides a way of building integrated solutions out of
existing services. To this end, services from diﬀerent providers are composed using advanced orchestration
and choreography techniques. However, while this principle allows for greater ﬂexibility at a smaller cost,
the use of third party services also includes a risk: Deployed services might not work as claimed by their
providers. In this paper, we propose a technique for analyzing the expected reliability of service composi-
tions based on ratings given by (previous) service users. Every service thereby comes with a reputation, and
the analysis computes an overall reliability of a service composition from the reputations of its constituent
services. The proposed model-driven approach proceeds by translating statechart models of service compo-
sitions into input for a probabilistic model checker (PRISM) using state-of-the-art model transformations
techniques. The approach has been implemented as an Eclipse plug-in and is fully compliant with UML.
Keywords: Reliability prediction, service oriented architectures, probabilistic model checking, model
transformations.
1 Introduction
Today, complex systems can be built by composing services to deliver integrated
solutions, allowing greater ﬂexibility, reuse of existing functionality, scalability, etc.
Alike component-based systems, services can be obtained from diﬀerent software
providers by searching existing repositories for the required functionality. However,
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new system does not allow for an extensive testing of an external service. A software
designer thus has to rely on the provider’s speciﬁcation of the service functionality.
A deviation of the actual behavior of the service from its speciﬁcation thus only
becomes apparent during execution of the constructed software.
In this paper, we propose an alternative to time-consuming testing or expen-
sive formal analysis which is based on the use of a software provider’s or service’s
reputation. The reputation can (for instance) be obtained by ratings of users of a
service, like ratings for hotels and restaurants, or alternatively, by monitoring the
service every time it is executed and recording whether it behaves as speciﬁed. The
reputation is thus based on previous experience of users with the correctness of the
service. Depending on the reputation of single services, the overall expected reliabil-
ity of a service composition can be computed. Reliability herein is the probability
of failure-free, correct operation of a service composition (“continuity of correct
service” [9]). We take the reputation of a software provider as being an indication
for the reliability of its services. The overall expected reliability of a service com-
position is then not just the average or sum of the reputations of its constituent
services. Depending on the single service’s eﬀect on the overall behavior, a service
with a bad reputation might or might not have a large inﬂuence on the reliability of
the complete composition. In this paper we propose a technique for systematically
computing the reliability of a service composition based on its model annotated with
reputations of single services.
In our approach we follow a principle employed by a large number of tech-
niques for the analysis of non-functional properties of component-based systems. In
particular for performance analysis, a large body of work employing model-driven
approaches has been developed in recent years [22,10,14]. Models of component-
based systems are enhanced with information about performance attributes of single
entities, and these enhanced models are afterwards translated into various sorts of
analysis models (e.g. stochastic Petri nets, Markov chains, queuing networks). The
actual performance analysis is then carried out using standard tools operating on
such analysis models. In our setting, single services will be modeled using UML state
machines [6]. The reputation of a single service is given as a numeric value in the
range [0..1], describing the ratio of correct executions of the service. A service com-
position is then a choreography made up of reputation-annotated state machines.
Such service composition models are translated into Markov decision processes, in
which the probabilities of executing transitions are set according to the reputations
and the type of events (send, receive or internal event). We generate Markov deci-
sion processes (MDPs) in the form of an input to the probabilistic model checker
PRISM [18]. PRISM is then used to query the MDP for the probability of not
reaching error states, and the answer to this query is the overall expected reliability
of the service composition. For the generation of MDPs as input to PRISM we
follow state-of-the-art model transformation techniques: using the language ATL
[1] we deﬁne metamodel based rules for transforming UML state machine models
to PRISM models. The required state machine metamodel was taken directly from
the UML, and the PRISM metamodel had to be created. The model transformation
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is part of a larger Eclipse-based tool which provides automation of our approach.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we describe the
modeling and analysis formalisms used throughout the paper. Section 3 describes
the transformation between the design and analysis models described in these for-
malisms. The tool support of the proposed approach is discussed in section 4.
Section 5 gives an overview of related work and section 6 concludes the paper and
gives some directions for future work.
2 Concepts
2.1 Modeling of choreographies
A service choreography consists of communicating services that perform activities
and coordinate with each other by means of message exchange. Three basic ac-
tivities that can be performed by a service in a composition include sending and
receiving of messages, and internal activities. Communication can have synchronous
or asynchronous character depending on the particular composition. In our setting,
communication between the services is synchronous 4 - It is possible only if both
communicating processes are able to execute the transitions with the sending and
receiving events pair at the same time. This might require one of the communication
parties to wait.
The modeling approach chosen in this work to describe compositions of com-
municating services is based on UML [6] state machines with a CSP-like [19] com-
munication. Alternatively, other approaches like StoCharts [21] or Component-
Interaction automata [11] could have been chosen as a basis for compositions mod-
eling.
A model consists of one or more UML state machines that contain an arbi-
trary number of parallel composed statecharts representing services (separated by
regions). Each statechart is described by its states and transitions, that can be
triggered by an internal, receiving, or sending event which is indicated through la-
bels a, a?, and a! respectively. For modeling these events we use the speciﬁc kinds
of events provided by the UML for inter-process communication: ExecutionEvent,
ReceiveSignalEvent, and SendSignalEvent.
Figure 1 illustrates the above discussed with an example of two services - supplier
and buyer. Each service is presented by a statechart in its own state machine and
region. They communicate on two occasions: ﬁrst, to pass an order from the buyer
to the supplier, and later, to inform the buyer about the order status. Note that
the diagram additionally contains the reputations associated with the individual
services. This is realized by a UML proﬁle keeping our choreography models UML
compliant.
4 Asynchronous type can be modeled through an additional statechart that represents the communication
channel.
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Fig. 1. Supplier and buyer choreography modeling example
2.2 Reliability analysis model
The modeling notation chosen in this work and described above is fairly straight-
forward and familiar to most software architects. However, it is mostly not sup-
ported by existing formal analysis techniques including model checking. Therefore,
in order to analyze a choreography using model checking, its model has to be ﬁrst
transformed into the corresponding analysis model in accepted format. The model
checker used in this work is the Probabilistic Symbolic Model Checker (PRISM) [3],
therefore, its modeling language has to be introduced ﬁrst.
The PRISM modeling language is based on the Reactive Modules formalism [7].
It allows description of a system as a Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC), Con-
tinuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC), or Markov Decision Process (MDP) model.
Main elements of an analysis model are modules and variables. Modules contain
ﬁnite range local variables and commands. A PRISM command has the following
form:
[a] g -> p1:(upd11)&...&(upd1m1)+...+ pn:(updn1)&...&(updnmn);
The command consists of two parts divided by the transition sign →. The left hand
side contains an action label a within the square brackets, which is used for processes
synchronization, followed by a transition guard g. When the guard g is true, an
action a, if not empty, forces simultaneous execution of all commands labeled with
a within the model. The command’s right hand side contains n possible mutually
excluding variable updates sets each of which is equipped with a probability pi.
Each set contains mi variable updates updij which take place simultaneously.
Before providing an example of a PRISM module, the setting when more than
one command can be executed at the same time needs to be discussed. In this case,
the choice of one of the alternatives depends on the PRISM model type. DTMC and
CTMC models assign equal probabilities to all alternatives, whereas MDP models
simulate non-deterministic choice. In this work we focus on MDP models for service
compositions since, compared to DTMC and CTMC, they additionally provide a
mechanism for describing the cases when the choice between alternative execution
paths of a service is not determined by a ﬁxed probability distribution. This allows
expressing inﬂuence of external environment on the system, changes of parameters
within such environment, etc..
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module M
x : [0..1] init 1;
y : [0..1] init 0; z : [0..1] init 0;
[] x=1 -> 0.2: (y’=1) & (x’=0) + 0.8: (z’=1) & (x’=0);
[a1] y=1 -> (x’=1) & (y’=0);
[a2] z=1 -> (x’=1) & (z’=0);
endmodule
Fig. 2. PRISM module example
Figure 2 provides an example of a PRISM module M with three ﬁnite range
variables x, y and z, and commands containing updates. The internal command
with the guard x = 1 and without any synchronization takes place ﬁrst, since the
local variable x is initially set to 1. This command has two alternative update sets:
the ﬁrst assigns variables y to 1 and x to 0, and the second assigns variable z to 1
and x to 0. The ﬁrst set has the probability of 0.2 and the second - 0.8. As variable
x has been set to 0, the ﬁrst command cannot be executed again. Instead, one of
the commands with the guards y = 1 or z = 1, depending on the previously chosen
update set, can now be executed. These commands synchronize with some module
on action labels a1 or a2 and set variable x to 1, so the cycle can be repeated.
Modules that represent diﬀerent interacting processes within the model, can be
composed together in a process-algebraic expression. This expression should fea-
ture each module exactly once, and contain CSP-based operators including: parallel
composition with full or partial synchronization over shared actions, asynchronous
parallel composition, and operators for hiding and renaming of actions within the
module. An analysis model described in PRISM modeling language is later trans-
lated by the model checker into a Markov model.
The described language allows deﬁnition of analysis models which can be used to
model check various system properties including its reliability. The question to be
discussed next, is the transformation of a design model of a choreography (section
2.1) into a model in the PRISM language.
3 Transformation concept
3.1 Reputation interpretation
To be able to analyze a service composition described in a design model, it has to be
transformed into the analysis model in the selected format. In order to describe this
transformation, it is necessary to deﬁne element mappings and analyze transition
probabilities within the design model.
In this work we determine transition probabilities based on the reputation data
of individual services and transition types. Given a reputation of a service as a
whole, it is possible to choose between various interpretations of this information
with regards to the probabilities of individual transitions. In this work we use the
following interpretation:
• Internal actions of a service are not observable for other communication parties
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and, therefore, do not directly inﬂuence its observed reliability. Hence, transitions
due to internal actions are assumed to always occur, i.e., have probabilities of 1.
• Message receipts by a service are observed by other parties. Services are assumed
to always accept messages, possibly discarding them later. Following this as-
sumption, such transitions always occur, and also do not directly inﬂuence the
observed reliability, i.e., have probabilities of 1.
• Message sendings by a service are observed by other communication parties, as
they initiate communication. Their success probabilities inﬂuence the observed
reliability of the containing service. Therefore, such transitions occur with the
probability equal to the observed reputation of the containing services.
Additionally, it is assumed that a message sending failure causes service inter-
ruption with no possibility of repair.
For the example presented earlier in Figure 1 this interpretation would mean that
all transitions are executed with the probability of 1 except of the conﬁrmation and
rejection sending, which are executed with the probability of 0.88. This interpre-
tation combined with the knowledge of the design and analysis model formats can
now be used to deﬁne the required transformation rules.
3.2 Transformation rules
The idea behind the proposed transformation rules is to create an analysis model,
where each service is represented by its own PRISM module with the same name.
These modules contain local variables needed to describe diﬀerent states of their
corresponding services, and commands to describe transitions between these states.
A set of local variables of such a module always contains exactly one start variable
and variables for unique ﬁnal states of the service. The start variable initialized
with 1 represents the start state of the service.
We use the following rules to transform a transition into one or more PRISM
commands. Depending on the type of triggering event, one of the options in Figure 3
is chosen:
Fig. 3. Transformation concept for transitions with diﬀerent triggering event types
Note that the deﬁnition of these rules is based on the interpretation of reputation
for probabilities of individual transitions discussed in section 3.1.
In all three cases the transition is preformed between the states s and t. Trans-
lated into the PRISM command, the ﬁrst fact is represented by the boolean expres-
sion vs = 1 as a guard. The fact, that the service has left the state s and entered
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the state t, is represented by two updates v′s = 0 and v′t = 1 respectively, where vs
and vt denote local variables corresponding to the service states s and t. Further
event type speciﬁc details of the transformation rules can be combined under the
corresponding sub items:
a) Transitions triggered by internal actions a are transformed into commands that
contain mentioned updates v′s = 0 and v′t = 1 without any synchronization.
b) Transitions triggered by receiving events a? are transformed into commands
similar to the case a) that are, however, labeled with synchronization actions
a. This is done to ensure that the receiving and sending (case c)) command
pair, that represents communication between two services through a message a,
is only executed synchronously.
c) Transitions triggered by sending events a! are transformed into pairs of two
subsequent commands. The ﬁrst command represents two alternatives: a mes-
sage will be sent with the probability equal to the reliability reputation of the
containing service, or a failure with the complementary probability. If the ﬁrst
alternative is chosen, the variable update v′senda = 1 is performed, representing
the fact that the message will be sent. If the second alternative is chosen, the
update v′fail = 1 is performed, representing sending failure which makes further
commands execution within the module impossible.
The second command is only executed if the ﬁrst probabilistic choice indicates
that the message a will be sent. This command is labeled with the synchroniza-
tion action a to ensure its simultaneous execution with the receiving command
a? (case b)).
Figure 4 illustrates this transformation rule on an MDP fragment for transition
a!. The fragment consists of three transitions: from state s either to one of the
added intermediate states senda or fail, and from state senda to state t. The
ﬁrst two transitions with the complementary probabilities reliability and 1 -
reliability represent the two alternatives within the ﬁrst command, whereas the
last transition represents the second command and the actual sending of the
message a with probability of 1.
Fig. 4. Sending transition transformation into an MDP fragment
As the states within a design model are unnamed, we had to deﬁne a naming
mechanism for the variables vs, vt, vsenda and vfail. The following naming conven-
tions have been used:
• The variable vs is named depending on the location of the state s within the
statechart as follows:
· start, if s is an initial state.
· variable that represent successful completion of an incoming transition (s′, s),
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if s is an intermediate state. Naming of such variables is discussed next in the
context of variable vt.
• The variable vt is named depending on the type of the state t and of the transition
(s, t) with the triggering event a as follows:
· corresponding ﬁnal state variable, if t is a ﬁnal state.
· a, if t is an intermediate state and (s, t) is an internal or receiving transition.
· aSent, if t is an intermediate state and (s, t) is a sending transition.
• The variable vsenda is named a, where a is the name of the triggering event of the
original sending transition a!.
• The variable vfail, unlike vsenda, is shared by all commands within a module and
is, therefore, simply named fail.
Note that the set of variables may contain a fail variable, if the reputation of the
corresponding service is less than 100%. To comply with the requirements of the
PRISM language all variable names are extended by the name of the containing
module.
Figure 5 illustrates the result of this transformation for the supplier and buyer
design model example. It contains two modules - Buyer and Supplier, described
by their local variables and commands, and synchronized on shared actions: order,
conﬁrmation, and rejection. Module Buyer has variables startBuyer, orderBuyer
and orderBuyerSent for the commands representing order sending transition, and a
variable ﬁnishBuyer for the ﬁnal state 5 . Module Supplier apart from start variable
startSupplier contains a failSupplier variable, as its reputation is less than 100%.
This module also has an orderSupplier variable for the order receiving command,
and a processingSupplier variable for the processing command. Two variables conﬁr-
mationSupplier and rejectionSupplier are added for the conﬁrmation and rejection
sending commands.
The commands within both modules can be derived by application of the dis-
cussed transformation rules to transitions, and usage of appropriate variables and
synchronization actions. The resulting model can now be analyzed in PRISM to
check various properties of the composition. These properties have to be formalized
in the PRISM properties speciﬁcation language. In this work, in order to obtain the
expected reliability, we expressed it as a probability of not reaching a failure state
during the lifetime of the system or formally, for an MDP system model containing
k failure states:
Pmin=?[!(F (fail1 = 1||...||failk = 1))]
Pmax=?[!(F (fail1 = 1||...||failk = 1))]
The value of these properties for the above example is equal to 0.88.
The proposed rules enable step-by-step creation of comprehensible analysis mod-
els of service compositions for further analysis with the PRISM model checker.
However, to facilitate application of the proposed reliability prediction approach, it
5 When the ﬁnal state has no name, the corresponding variable is named ﬁnish.
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Fig. 5. Analysis model for the supplier and buyer example
is necessary to provide required tool support. Therefore, the tool support, which
development was carried out as part of this work, will be discussed next.
4 Tool support
As already mentioned, the reliability prediction approach proposed in this work
contains several steps, which are summarized in Figure 6.
First, a service composition is modeled as described in section 2.1, and anno-
tated with reputations. Then this design model is transformed into the analysis
model via application of the transformation rules informally explained in section
3.2. Finally, the resulting model together with the model-speciﬁc reliability prop-
erty speciﬁcation is analyzed using the PRISM model checker. The result of such
an analysis provides the reliability value of the service composition described in the
initial design model.
Tool support for some of these steps like UML modeling and model checking
with PRISM already exist. Other steps like model annotation and transformation
required development of appropriate supporting mechanisms.
G. Besova et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 279 (2) (2011) 3–16 11
The Eclipse platform with its ﬂexible plug-in based architecture and numer-
ous useful third-party plug-ins has been chosen as a development and application
platform for our approach. This choice allows the reuse of already existing UML2
conform modeling tools (e.g. UML2 Tools [5], TOPCASED [4]) realized as Eclipse
plug-ins, to support the design model deﬁnition. The following steps of our ap-
proach are not directly supported in Eclipse, however, various plug-ins signiﬁcantly
simpliﬁed the development process of our transformation tool.
Fig. 6. Reliability prediction approach steps
First of all, we rely on the Eclipse Modeling Framework (EMF) for storing and
retrieving our models. Moreover, the ATL transformation language [1](supported
by a third-party plug-in) was used to deﬁne and apply the model transformation
rules. Finally, we used the JET-template model-to-text engine [2] which allowed us
to generate a textual representation of the transformed model. The PRISM model
checker is, unfortunately, not integrated within the Eclipse platform, therefore, the
analysis model produced by our tool has to be imported manually. The last two
steps of the model-to-model transformation and the model-to-text transformation
have been integrated in our tool.
Figure 7 illustrates the transformation principle and the artifacts needed for its
implementation. It demonstrates, that the deﬁnition of the ATL transformation
rules and JET-templates required UML and PRISM language metamodels. The
later was also developed in this work.
The last point to be mentioned is the annotation of design models. Our approach
takes advantage of an existing lightweight UML extension mechanism by means of
proﬁles. To enable annotation of UML statecharts with reputations, we deﬁned
a UML proﬁle that contains a stereotype for state machine regions allowing these
regions to carry a so-called tagged value storing a reliability value. As regions are
used to separate services within one state machine, each region requires a reputation
value.
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Fig. 7. Metamodel based model transformation principle
5 Related work
Prediction of reliability has always attracted research interest. Numerous ap-
proaches have been proposed to address the growing complexity of component-based
[28,15,23,16,24,25] and service-oriented systems [17,13,29,31,20,8,14,26,32,30,27,12].
Most of these approaches rely on some model of a system architecture expressed
in a speciﬁcation language like UML([14], our method), BPEL ([31,8]), WSCI ([27]),
etc.. In the case of orchestrated services workﬂow diagrams (e.g. UML activity dia-
grams [14]) are generally used. Service choreographies, on the other hand, are mod-
eled through the speciﬁcation of communication between the parties (e.g. WSCI
speciﬁcation [27], communicating state machines in our case). The further choice
of a concrete speciﬁcation language depends on the desired level of abstraction.
Additionally, most approaches require information on reliability of individual ser-
vices/components. In some methods actual reliabilities are required, whereas other
approaches including our rely on reputations.
Depending on the technique provided system models are either directly analyzed
using reduction rules to compute QoS [13,20,30], or transformed into some kind of
stochastic model [29,31,8,14,26,27,12] for further analysis, like in our case. The
most widely used stochastic models for this purpose include Markov models and
stochastic Petri nets with corresponding analysis algorithms. For instance, Zhong
and Qi [31] consider BPEL speciﬁcations and transform them into stochastic Petri
nets for analysis. Gallotti et al. [14] consider UML activity diagrams of an orches-
tration extended with QoS properties, and transform them into Markov models.
Our approach is similar to [14] as it also uses Markov model and PRISM model
checker for reliability analysis, however, it is focused on service choreographies, and,
therefore, considers diﬀerent UML diagrams used for communicating services.
Xia et al. [27] propose the only other approach, that we are aware of except of our,
that considers choreographies. It is based on WSCI speciﬁcations of compositions,
which are translated into a General Stochastic Petri net for reliability prediction.
Compared to our approach, the authors focus on models at a diﬀerent abstraction
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level and apply other analysis techniques. This allows complementary usage of both
methods at diﬀerent system development stages.
Some authors [30,24] also address the problem of obtaining required reliability
information for individual services/components. Zheng and Lyu [30] propose col-
laborative mechanism for predicting reliability of a service for a user based on the
data collected from similar users, who have used this service. According to the
authors, this mechanism demonstrates better reliability prediction accuracy than
other approaches, however, it can only be applied if the failure data of services is
available. This requires the service to be implemented and deployed. Roshandel,
et al. [24] propose an architecture-based mechanism for reliability prediction of a
component using Markov models, which makes it similar to some system-level ap-
proaches and does not require a component to be implemented. This is achieved
due to the Hidden Markov models used to address the lack of an operational proﬁle.
Our approach, like other mentioned techniques except of [30,25], assumes service
reputations to be supplied by some reputation provider. Such a provider could be
based on these mechanisms.
Later, in [25] the authors extend [24] to estimate system reliability. This ap-
proach is based on a system model very similar to ours. It describes communicating
components as a set of concurrent state machine containing interaction protocols
of components. This model is transformed into a Dynamic Bayesian Network that
includes reliabilities of individual components. Compared to [25], our approach
does not associate service reliability with its probability of start, instead sending
transitions are assumed to carry reliability-relevant probabilities. Unlike [25], where
component-based systems are considered, we assume that services have no failure
dependencies.
With respect to existing approaches, our method represents a ﬁrst attempt to
develop methodology and tool support for predicting reliability of service choreogra-
phies at the early design stage based on formal methods.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a technique for computing the expected reliability
of service choreographies based on reputations of single services. The technique
involved transforming metamodel instances of UML state machines into Markov
decision processes in the form of an input to PRISM. The probabilistic model checker
PRISM could then be used to determine the expected reliability. The approach has
been implemented on the basis of state-of-the-art model transformation techniques
and is UML compliant.
In the future, we intend to investigate how diﬀerent forms of information about
the correctness of services, some obtained by monitoring, some by a formal analy-
sis, can be combined for reliability prediction. Furthermore, we will evaluate our
approach on realistic case studies. This will in particular show whether our interpre-
tation of reputations as being probabilities of sending transitions is the right choice
for choreographies, or whether other choices, possibly depending on the application
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domain, are valid as well.
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